Bad science: The precision fallacy

Precision in scientific results is almost universally claimed to be a good thing. Precise and reproducible results are invariably used to claim that:

• The theory is valid
• The theory is ‘fundamental’
• The theory is ‘universal’

Of course, none of these are true without further argument and in certain cases, a large degree of precision can actually act as an indicator that something is going very wrong with the scientific process.

The anomalous magnetic dipole moment

Experiments in quantum physics have measured some theoretical quantity to 14 decimal places: Wikipedia and this is frequently quoted in support of the validity and fundamental nature of quantum physics in general.

The experiment purports to match theoretical predictions with experimental outcomes concerning a very specific, and some might say artificial, experimental setup. The setup is claimed to measure precise quantum events at a very small scale of reality

We can ask:

• How is this relevant to the situation in the remainder of the universe?
• How are laboratory measurements representative of natural events?
• Is this really a discovery of specifically ‘fundamental’ importance?
• If results as precise as this are proof simply by virtue of their precision, then what about all the less precise results in physics? Are they somehow now devalued?
• How are atomic scale results relevant to macro or even cosmic scale realities?
• Is this form of scientific reductionism worth anything at all?

An analogy: Cymatic resonance

We can think of an analogous experiment where we form a roughly circular space, fill it with water and then subject it to a variety of acoustic frequencies. Waves form in the water and we observe some pretty interference patterns.

A mathematical theory of cymatics is proposed and we find we can start to make rough predictions as to the outcomes of our experiments. We have a collection of experimental results which are largely reproducible but with the occasional ‘anomaly’. Further refinements of our setup including increasingly precise machining of the circular space seem to eliminate the anomalies and result in more accurate predictions of the outcomes and; we feel increasingly pleased with ourselves.

A theory of the fundamental nature of water has been found, water is declared to be ‘wave-like’ in nature and by extension all gases and solids are, at their most basic level, ‘wave-like’ from the atomic to cosmic level. A Nobel prize is surely deserved.

Cynics, however, might say:

• The theory has not been shown to extend to larger scales
• We have not shown anything at all to be ‘fundamental’
• The restrictive aspect of the theory does not account for the wide variety of patterns we see in nature
• The rigid aspect of the theory does not account for the free-flowing nature of the patterns we see in nature
• In refining our set up to such a degree we have deliberately eliminated any hint of natural variation to the results; we have ruled out anything interesting or relevant to the real world
• Even the ‘anomalies’ that we have eliminated are subject to the laws of physics and therefore need some explanation. We just regarded them as an inconvenience.
• In declaring our results to be ‘fundamental’ we have ruled out the future possibility of formulating any postulate that disagrees with our initial ideas

Reductionism

Reductionism is the philosophical idea that complex things can be understood by breaking them down into their simplest parts.

In physics, this means explaining the entire universe by studying its smallest building blocks, like atoms and subatomic particles. It is the driving logic behind why many physicists believe reality is fundamentally quantum in nature – AI

Note the sudden transition here from ‘simplest parts’ to ‘smallest building blocks’. The assumption is that the simplest parts of a system are necessarily the smallest parts of a system.

This is the central assumption of reductionism and could even serve as a definition of reductionism. It cannot, however, be described as a ‘driving logic’ as there is no logic here, merely an unsupported ‘assertion’ of some kind.

If we believe that an electric field can organise charged particles into a torus shape then this is the simplest explanation for the observed phenomena in space and in laboratory experiments. However, this refutes reductionism as the electric field here is the largest and simplest element whilst the particles themselves are both the smallest and most complex elements at the same time.

Moreover, in the field physics of Konstantin Meyl, the particles themselves arise from the extended field and not the other way around.

Note that if the toroidal shape is explained by the properties of the particles alone, then the same identical shapes would arise time and again as the properties of the particles never change. To use an analogy from Steiner, the shape of a house will only depend upon the properties of the individual bricks.

An analogy: Growing a tree

We see a tree growing so we try to measure the rate of growth and find that it varies throughout time and location and seems to depend upon the amount of sunlight and water it receives.

We wish to investigate and so we put a sapling inside a tube in a laboratory and control the artificial light, water and nutrients that we feed to it.

We get some results for the growth rate which are precise and reproducible and naturally imagine that we have found a Fundamental Equation for Growth.

What have we really discovered about trees in their natural environment? Are we really controlling for all possible variables? Have we really discovered anything ‘fundamental’ at all? Can the artefact we have produced even be classified as a ‘tree’?

Can precision be a bad thing?

Scientists consistently quote the 14 decimal places of the magnetic dipole moment as evidence for the correctness of quantum physics. Fine, so let us take them at their word and then ask “What of the less precise results in the whole of science?”

The point is that if a very precise result gives us confidence then the lesser results should necessarily cause doubts in our minds. If the rest of science is true then why can we not get precise results all the time?

One answer is ‘noise’, but whatever the noise consists of, it is still part of the physical world and so must be subject to the Laws of Physics. Noise itself is therefore a valid topic for investigation but will likely, by its very nature, give results which are less than precise and so be discarded by the ‘precision mindset’ of contemporary scientists.

Precision, by itself, surely cannot be a bad thing, but the single minded pursuit of precision seems to engender a narrow and destructive mindset.

Choice of variables?

In our experiment growing a tree, we eliminated several factors which were present in nature such as contact with animals or proximity to other trees. We were fairly sure that these were not relevant to the growth rate and that our measurements of water, light and nutrients were sufficient to describe all growth behaviour of all trees everywhere; these metrics were considered fundamental to the theory and, by extension, fundamental to reality.

This is clearly short-sighted and some sort of intellectual restraint was necessary, but this rarely seems to happen in science where the fundamental elements of the model are inevitably assumed to correspond to some fundamental properties of actual reality.

The choice of variables is related to what can actually be measured and this is related to what measuring techniques are available. However, there is no guarantee that these variables ever represent the Fundamental Nature of Reality.

What is fundamental in physics?

Simon Shnoll

Shnoll performed repetitive experiments involving the most basic of physical processes including measuring the rate of decay of radioactive elements and found that results varied with both solar and lunar cycles.

Radioactive decay is said to be driven by fundamental quantum processes but if both the sun and the moon are somehow affecting those processes then they cannot possibly be fundamental.

The underlying theory is therefore wrong and it doesn’t matter how many decimal places of precision are measured in experiments elsewhere in somebody else’s laboratory.

The Schnoll effect

Do laboratory experiments reflect natural processes?

Look out of the window, watch the trees swaying in the breeze and the clouds move across the sky. Very nice, but none of this can be precisely predicted or reproduced.

Why then are scientists so fixated upon precision and reproducibility?

Nature is flexible and adaptable but laboratory experiments are restricted and rigid, with noise and variation deliberately kept to a minimum.

Without referring to any particular experiment, how likely does it seem that the limited and precise experiments performed in a laboratory could ever be truly representative of the remainder of reality?

Summary

Physicists have chosen to emphasise a very restricted set of experimental results and to use these as a basis for a theoretical system.

The theoretical system is first said to be representative of reality and then after while is actually conflated with reality, with abstract theoretical concepts such as mass, gravity and forces claimed to be, not only real, but ‘fundamental’ as well.

The result is that of several generations of scientists living in a self-constructed theoretical bubble which has little to do with everyday reality and provides a distorted view of nature.

The physicists will now close their eyes and ears to anything that does not derive from their basic equations and will make no significant progress in scientific thought.

One good result in quantum mechanics does not prove the rest of quantum mechanics, let alone the whole of reality.